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In 2001 and 2003, the Bush 
administration proposed a significant 
reduction in income taxes, which was 
later adopted by Congress. In general, 
reducing income taxes could be benefi-
cial for the economy, since it raises the 
incentive to work and leads to a higher 
level of income. Yet, the proposal to 
lower taxes was met with opposition. 
One popular argument against lower-
ing taxes is that without an equivalent 
roposals to lower taxes often meet with 
opposition in Congress. One argument is 
that lowering taxes without an equivalent fall 
in government spending may lead to future 
budget deficits, which will translate into higher long-term 
interest rates and a lower level of income. In this article, 
Sylvain Leduc examines the theoretical arguments under 
which budget deficits lead to higher interest rates. He 
also surveys empirical studies that used data on expected 
budget deficits to document the possibility that increases






fall in government spending, a drop in 
taxes may lead to future budget defi-
cits, which will translate into higher 
long-term interest rates and a lower 
level of income. 
Recently, the debate over 
budget deficits’ impact on interest 
rates has created a lot of turmoil in the 
financial press. For instance, an edito-
rial in the Wall Street Journal stated 
that “the notion that deficits cause 
interest rates to rise is a fiction argued 
by Robert Rubin, President Clinton’s 
Treasury secretary. There wasn’t any 
empirical evidence to support this 
argument when Mr. Rubin trotted it 
out, and there’s still isn’t.” However, 
in his testimony to Congress in Febru-
ary 2003, Alan Greenspan, Chairman 
of the Federal Reserve Board, stated: 
“There is no question that if deficits go 
up, contrary to what some have said, 
it does affect long-term interest rates; 
it does have a negative impact on the 
economy.” 
Let’s examine the theoretical 
arguments under which budget deficits 
lead to higher interest rates and survey 
empirical studies that used data on ex-
pected budget deficits to document the 
possibility that increases in future bud-
get deficits are associated with higher 
real long-term interest rates. 
THE DEBATE IS NOT NEW,
AS PRESIDENT REAGAN
WILL TELL YOU
Until recently, budget deficits 
were closely associated with either eco-
nomic downturns or military expenses 
during periods of war (Figure 1).1 For 
instance, World War I brought about a 
cumulated budget deficit that reached 
17 percent of GDP in 1919, but the 
budget was brought back into surpluses 
in the 1920s. Similarly, because of the 
combined effects of the Great Depres-
sion in the 1930s and World War II, 
the federal government posted deficits 
from 1931 to 1946. The war effort 
pushed the budget deficit to a level as 
high as 30 percent of GDP in 1943. 
The deficit also rose during the Korean 
and Vietnam wars.
However, the close relation-
ship between budget deficits and 
periods of war or recessions came to 
an abrupt end at the beginning of the 
1980s. Indeed, the federal budget was  Sylvain Leduc is
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in deficit throughout that decade and 
most of the roaring 1990s, even though 
this period coincided with the longest 
peacetime expansion in U.S. history. 
The break in the relationship occurred 
in President Reagan’s first term in of-
fice. In 1981, the Republican Party 
won the White House on a platform 
to cut marginal income tax rates and 
decrease nondefense government 
spending. The underlying goal was 
to diminish the economic distortion 
associated with income taxation. By 
lowering after-tax income, high mar-
ginal income tax rates might decrease 
the incentive to work and hamper 
economic performance. (This is often 
referred to as supply-side economics, 
since it emphasizes taxation’s effect on 
the supply of goods in the economy. In 
comparison, Keynesianism emphasizes 
taxation’s impact on the demand for 
goods in the economy.)
In Reagan’s first year in of-
fice, Congress adopted his proposal 
to lower marginal tax rates. However, 
lower revenues due to the tax cut and 
the recession of 1981-82, combined 
FIGURE 1
Federal Budget Deficit (as a percent of GDP)
with the increase in defense spending, 
contributed to the large budget deficits 
throughout his first term. The budget 
deficit reached 4 percent of GDP in 
1982 and 6 percent of GDP in 1983. 
We have to go back to 1934, in the 
midst of the Great Depression, to ob-
serve a level of peacetime budget defi-
cits as high as those in the early 1980s.
Then, as now, a debate raged 
over the consequences of the deficits.  
For instance, the Council of Economic 
Advisers under the chairmanships of 
Murray Weidenbaum and Martin Feld-
stein warned of the potential negative 
impact of large (prospective) budget 
deficits on the economy.2 The Council 
of Economic Advisers and the OMB 
would, in the end, convince President 
Reagan to tackle the deficit issue by 
raising taxes. But the U.S. would have 
to wait until 1998 before the red ink 
had all been spilled and the govern-




According to the standard 
theory, the way a government decides 
to finance a given level of expenditure 
has important repercussions for the 
economy. In particular, suppose the 
government decides to lower income 
taxes and starts financing its spending 
by increasing the amount of funds it 
borrows from the public. Consum-
ers, according to this view, will save 
only part of the rise in their after-tax 
income and spend the remainder on 
goods. Since the fall in government 
savings is not fully matched by a rise in 
private savings (since consumers spend 
part of their tax cut), total savings in 
the economy must fall. For economies 
without access to (or that do not make 
use of) foreign sources of funds, the 
level of national savings — which is 
the difference between output and 
consumption — has important impli-
cations for the future level of output.
In today’s world of highly 
developed financial markets, countries 
often borrow and lend to each other. 
For instance, a country may decide to 
According to the
standard theory, the 
way a government 






2 In the 1983 Economic Report of the President, 
the Council notes that “a succession of large 
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consume more than it produces by im-
porting relatively more goods from oth-
er countries than it exports and paying 
for them by borrowing in financial 
markets. In economic terminology, the 
current account would be in deficit, 
while the capital account would be in 
surplus.3  However, if an economy does 
not have access to financial markets, 
it will not be able to finance a trade 
deficit — that is, import more than it 
exports — by borrowing from other 
countries. The only way to pay for 
imports would be with revenues from 
exports. In other words, net exports 
would have to be zero. 
To understand the implica-
tions of having zero net exports, we 
need to make a small detour to the 
world of accounting. The national 
income and product accounts (NIPA) 
divide the amount of output produced 
in the economy into four broad cat-
egories: private consumption, govern-
ment consumption, investment, and 
net exports. In other words, the output 
produced in any given period can 
be used by the private sector or the 
government, invested, or traded with 
other countries. If the amount of goods 
produced in the economy is larger than 
the sum of investment and consump-
tion by the private sector and the gov-
ernment, net exports will be positive 
because the country would export the 
output left over after accounting for 
consumption and investment. 
Because the difference be-
tween output and consumption (by 
both the private sector and the govern-
ment) is defined as national savings, 
the national accounts tell us that 
national savings must equal national 
investment, whenever net exports are 
zero. The important consequence for 
a country without access to foreign 
sources of funds (that is, net exports 
are zero) is that if national savings fall 
following a tax cut, investment must 
also necessarily fall. This is achieved 
through an increase in long-term inter-
est rates that works to choke off invest-
ment and to bring it in line with the 
lower level of national savings. And 
the lower level of investment will be 
reflected in lower levels of real GDP in 
the future. 
The outcome would be dif-
ferent for an economy with access to 
foreign sources of funds. In this case, 
an increase in the amount of funds 
borrowed from foreigners would make 
up for the fall in the level of national 
savings. In other words, a country 
could consume and invest more than it 
produces by importing relatively more 
goods from abroad than it exports 
(that is, the current account would be 
in deficit) and finance it by borrowing 
funds from foreigners (that is, the capi-
tal account would be in surplus). De-
pending on how important the country 
is in world financial markets, the de-
mand for foreign funds may still push 
interest rates upward. However, invest-
ment would not have to fall as a result. 
In an economy with access to foreign 
sources of funds, domestic investment 
does not need to equal national sav-
ings. Because the country can borrow 
from foreigners, domestic investment 
can be financed out of national savings 
or foreign sources of funds and via a 
current account deficit. 
In fact, at the same time that 
the U.S. saw its budget deficit mush-
room in the 1980s, it also saw a grow-
ing current account deficit (Figure 2). 
However, even in the face of a grow-
ing current account deficit, Martin 
Feldstein, chairman of the Council of 
Economic Advisers at the time and a 
proponent of the standard theory, con-
tinued to argue that the fall in invest-
ment would be very substantial. His 
argument was based on a finding that 
he and Charles Horioka uncovered 
in the early 1980s. They found that 
even though capital flows increased 
FIGURE 2
Current Account (as a percent of GDP)
3 The current account is defined as the sum 
of the trade balance — that is, exports minus 
imports — and investment earnings abroad. 
Typically, the latter is a very small fraction of 
the current account. Therefore, the current 
account is approximately equal to the trade 
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substantially across countries, the fact 
remained that domestic investment 
was closely linked to domestic saving. 
Indeed, Figure 3 shows that movements 
in domestic investment closely mimic 
those in national savings, the differ-
ence between the two being accounted 
for by the current account. 
In other words, countries did 
not take advantage of foreign sources 
of funds, since net exports and cur-
rent account deficits/surpluses remain 
relatively small. Therefore, a fall in 
national savings stemming from a rise 
in the budget deficit would very likely 
be followed by a fall in investment and 
capital formation. In a nutshell, the 
economy would pay for the fall in taxes 




The main tenet of the stan-
dard theory is that national savings 
falls following a shift in government 
finance away from taxes toward bor-
rowing. The reason is that consumers 
will save only part of their tax cut and 
spend what is left. But why would con-
sumers save only part of the tax cut? 
Why not save it all? After all, the gov-
ernment will have to repay the money 
it borrowed some day, and it will have 
to raise taxes to do so. A forward-
looking consumer will anticipate this 
necessity and accurately predict that 
his level of taxation will rise at some 
later date. As a result, he may very well 
decide to save all his current tax cut. If 
this occurs, the fall in government sav-
ings would be matched by an equiva-
lent increase in private savings, leaving 
national savings constant. Since na-
tional savings does not change, inter-
est rates would not have to rise and 
thereby choke off investment. In the 
case of an open economy —that is, one 
that engages in international trade and 
financial transactions — the amount of 
funds borrowed from foreigners would 
not have to increase to keep the same 
level of investment constant. Since the 
level of borrowing from abroad remains 
the same, a rise in the budget deficit 
would also have no impact on the cur-
rent account. 
This approach to budget 
deficits was first formulated by the 
19th century English economist David 
Ricardo, but it was rediscovered and 
formalized by Robert Barro in a very 
influential article published in 1974. 
Economists refer to this view as Ricard-
ian equivalence. This theory argues 
that the way the government finances 
a given level of expenditure (such as a 
national army or a public road system) 
is irrelevant. Taxing or borrowing will 
lead to the same economic outcome 
because people are forward looking.
One important assumption 
buried underneath this elegant theory 
is the way the government taxes indi-
viduals. The theory assumes that each 
individual in the economy must pay 
the same amount in taxes irrespective 
of his income or of what he consumes. 
In other words, taxes are paid in a 
lump sum. Because taxes are not tied 
to the level of labor or capital income 
that an individual earns or to how 
much he consumes, lump sum taxes do 
not distort incentives to work, invest, 
and consume. 
In reality, to raise revenues, 
governments most often resort to taxes 
on labor and capital income or to taxes 
on goods and services. One could then 
be tempted to disregard the Ricardian 
equivalence theory as a cute abstrac-
tion that is empirically flawed and, 
therefore, not a serious guide for poli-
cymaking.  Consequently, an increase 
in the budget deficit would most likely 
lead to a fall in national savings and to 
an increase in interest rates. 
However, according to Nobel 
laureate Milton Friedman, theories 
should not be judged on the plausibil-
ity of their assumptions, but rather on 
the accuracy of their predictions. Is an 
increase in budget deficits associated 
with an increase in real long-term, 
interest rates, as the standard theory 
predicts? Or is the Ricardian equiva-
FIGURE 3
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lence theory, in which there is no link 
between budget deficits and real long-
term interest rates, a better representa-
tion of the world? 
CURRENT BUDGET DEFICITS 
AND INTEREST RATES  
The Ricardian equivalence 
theory argues that there should be
no positive relationship between
budget deficits and real long-term
interest rates, i.e., interest rates
adjusted for expected inflation.4  
Proponents of this view often point 
out that there is indeed no clear 
relationship between these variables 
in the data (Figure 4). There are 
times, such as the early 1980s, 
when the budget deficit and the real 
long-term interest rate move in the 
same direction: an increase in the 
budget deficit as a percent of GDP is 
associated with a rise in the real long-
term interest rate. However, at other 
times, an increase in the budget deficit 
as a percent of GDP is associated with 
a fall in the real long-term interest 
rate. For instance, since the beginning 
of 2000, the federal budget has gone 
from a surplus of 2.3 percent of GDP 
to a deficit of the same magnitude in 
the first quarter of 2003. Yet, real long-
term interest rates have fallen steadily 
over the same period. 
Note also that because the 
level of national savings is unaf-
fected by a rise in budget deficits 
under the Ricardian equivalence 
theory, a change in budget deficits is 
not predicted to lead to a change in 
the amount of funds borrowed from 
abroad, and, therefore, the current ac-
count. In the early 1980s, opponents 
of this theory often pointed out that 
this prediction was contradicted by 
the U.S. experience: the rise in budget 
deficits at the time was accompanied 
by a substantial increase in the current 
account deficit. Indeed, the current 
account deficit went from being ap-
proximately balanced at the start of 
the 1980s to registering a deficit of 
about 3.5 percent of GDP by 1987. Yet, 
proponents of the Ricardian equiva-
lence theory would point out that over 
a longer period of time, the relation-
ship between the budget deficit and 
the current account is not that clear. 
Although they moved in opposite di-
rections in the early 1980s, the budget 
deficit and the current account tended 
to be positively correlated between the 
mid-1980s and the end of the 1990s, 
before they once again started to drift 
apart in 2000 (Figure 5). 
It therefore seems that, as 
predicted by the Ricardian equivalence 
theory, there is no clear relationship 
between current budget deficits, on 
the one hand, and interest rates (or 
the current account), on the other. 
However, interest rates are affected not 
only by current budget deficits but also 
FIGURE 4
Real Long-Term Interest Rate vs. Federal
Government Deficit (as a percent of GDP)
4 If we assume that the economy has access to 
foreign sources of funds, Ricardian equivalence 
also implies there should be no relationship 
between the current account and real long-term 
interest rates. Proponents of this theory often 
point out that there is no clear relationship 
between these two variables over long periods.
The Ricardian equivalence theory argues 
that there should be no positive relationship 
between budget deficits and real long-term 
interest rates, i.e., interest rates adjusted for 
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by prospective ones. Accounting for 
movements in prospective budget defi-
cits turns out to be important for the 
empirical relationship between budget 
deficits and interest rates.
BUT THE FUTURE MATTERS
We have seen there is no clear 
relationship between the current bud-
get deficit and the real long-term inter-
est rate. However, what matters for real 
long-term interest rates is not so much 
the current budget deficit, but what the 
budget deficit is expected to be in the 
future. A higher expected deficit im-
plies that the government’s borrowing 
needs will be higher in the future. The 
standard theory would then predict a 
higher (short-term) interest rate in the 
future. But higher future short-term 
interest rates must necessarily raise 
long-term interest rates today. 
To see this, suppose that in-
stead of rising, long-term interest rates 
stayed constant. An investor would 
then be better off holding a sequence of 
FIGURE 5
Current Account and Budget Deficits
(as a percent of GDP)
short-term bonds paying the short-term 
interest rate in each period. Under 
this scenario, investors currently hold-
ing long-term bonds would be better 
off selling these assets and buying a 
sequence of short-term bonds instead. 
But this process would increase the 
supply of long-term bonds in the mar-
ket, causing their price to fall, and thus 
drive current long-term interest rates 
higher. This process would continue 
until, at the margin, the return to 
holding a long-term bond was equal 
What matters for real 
long-term interest 
rates is not so much 
the current budget 
deficit, but what the 
budget deficit is 
expected to be in the 
future.
to the return from holding a sequence 
of short-term bonds, according to the 
expectations theory of the term structure 
of interest rates.5
So, according to the standard 
theory, higher expected budget deficits 
lead to higher real long-term interest 
rates. Is this theory supported by the 
data?
PROSPECTIVE BUDGET
DEFICITS AND INTEREST 
RATES
Although formal studies 
testing the impact of current budget 
deficits on interest rates found mixed 
results (see the article by John Seater), 
there seems to be a positive relation-
ship between expected budget deficits 
and interest rates. Indeed, previous 
studies have highlighted the fact that 
prospective budget deficits and interest 
rates tend to move together. 
Paul Wachtel and John Young 
conducted the first study examin-
ing the impact of prospective budget 
deficits on interest rates. They used 
the federal budget forecasts (for up 
to two years ahead) from the Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB) 
and the Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO), over the period 1979 to 1986. 
To capture the effect of an unantici-
pated movement in the prospective 
deficit (what economists call a shock), 
they used revisions in the OMB’s and 
CBO’s budget forecasts of current fis-
cal years. If large future budget deficits 
lead to higher interest rates, unantici-
pated announcements of such deficits 
should lead financial markets to revise 
interest rates up. Wachtel and Young 
found that a $1 billion increase in the 
CBO’s forecast of the federal budget 
deficit for the current fiscal year led to 
5 The term structure of interest rates refers to 
the relationship among interest rates on bonds 
with different terms of maturity.36   Q2  2004 Business Review     Business Review  Q2  2004   37 www.phil.frb.org www.phil.frb.org www.phil.frb.org
6 A basis point is one hundredth
of a percentage point.
Yet, since the goal is to isolate 
the impact of fiscal policy on interest 
rates — such as a decision by Congress 
to lower taxes, thus raising budget 
deficits — we need to remove the 
implicit negative correlation between 
budget deficits and interest rates that 
occurs over the business cycle. Using 
longer-term forecasts is useful in ac-
complishing this goal, since the impact 
of the business cycle is over after ap-
proximately two to three years. Indeed, 
Laubach found that using long-term 
forecasts is important. For instance, 
he finds that a 1-percentage-point 
increase in the projected deficit as a 
fraction of GDP is associated with a 
25-basis-point rise in long-term interest 
rates, which is roughly twice as large as 
the effect uncovered by Wachtel and 
Young.7,8 
CONCLUSION
Are budget deficits associated 
with an increase in long-term interest 
rates? Recent empirical work shows 
that they are, once we account for 
the impact of expected future budget 
deficits on current long-term interest 
rates. Prospective budget deficits are 
important because by lowering the ex-
pected level of future national savings, 
they put upward pressure on expected 
short-term interest rates. According 
to the expectations theory of the term 
structure of interest rates, an increase 
in expected short-term interest rates 
raises current long-term interest rates, 
which can dampen investment and 
lead to lower levels of real GDP in the 
future.
The fact that a fall in na-
tional savings is associated with a rise 
in interest rates is consistent with the 
findings that, notwithstanding the 
increasing globalization of financial 
markets, national economies remain 
less integrated than is usually imag-
ined. Because domestic investment is 
still mostly financed out of national 
savings, an increase in future budget 
deficits that lowers expected future na-
tional savings is linked to an increase 
in interest rates that works to lower 
domestic investment and reduce the 
future level of output. 
7 Note that Wachtel and Young looked at the 
effect of a $1 billion change in the forecast of 
the budget deficit, whereas Laubach studied 
the impact of a 1-percentage-point increase in 
the forecast of the deficit as a percent of GDP.  
However, in Wachtel and Young, a $1 billion 
change in the budget deficit was roughly equal 
to 0.025 percent of GDP. Thus, their study 
would imply that a 1-percentage-point increase 
in the projected deficit to GDP ratio would lead 
interest rates to rise 12 basis points. 
 
8 The reader should keep in mind an important 
caveat to these analyses. Even though 
prospective budget deficits and interest rates 
are positively correlated, it does not necessarily 
imply that an increase in prospective budget 
deficits will cause interest rates to rise. The 
reason is that both may be rising because of 
movements in some other variables that remain 
unaccounted for in the empirical analysis. 
Prospective budget deficits are more likely to 
cause interest rates to rise to the extent that 
the impact of these other variables on budget 
deficits and interest rates is taken into account 
in the empirical work.
an average 0.30-basis-point increase 
in interest rates.6 Similarly, a $1 bil-
lion revision in the OMB’s forecast of 
budget deficits pushes interest rates 
up 0.18 basis point, on average. This 
impact is significant. For instance, 
in August 2003, the CBO revised its 
forecast of budget deficits for the next 
10 fiscal years that it initially made 
in March 2003. In the spring of 2003, 
the CBO forecast a surplus of $96 bil-
lion in 2010, which was revised to a 
deficit of $145 billion in August 2003. 
Other things being equal, Wachtel and 
Young’s estimate would imply a rise of 
72 basis points in interest rates.   
Recently, Thomas Laubach 
revisited the subject. Just as Wachtel 
and Young did, Laubach used forecasts 
of federal budget deficits from the 
OMB and the CBO from 1976 to 2003. 
One important difference between 
these two studies is that Laubach used 
forecasts with much longer horizons. 
Instead of studying forecasts of budget 
deficits two years in the future, he 
concentrated on the impact of budget 
deficits five years in the future.
There are good theoretical 
reasons for using longer-term fore-
casts. The state of the business cycle 
affects budget deficits. In recessions, 
tax revenues decline because fewer 
people are working. The fall in govern-
ment revenues automatically raises 
budget deficits. Moreover, the state of 
the business cycle also affects interest 
rates: they rise during expansions and 
fall during recessions. Therefore, a 
recession would tend to lower interest 
rates at the same time that it raised the 
budget deficit. Similarly, interest rates 
would rise and the budget deficit would 
fall during an expansion. Interest rates 
and budget deficits should therefore be 
negatively correlated along the business 
cycle.
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